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Playing with the Good Guys 





In public good games, voluntary contributions tend to start off high and decline as the game is 
repeated. If high contributors are matched, however, contributions tend to stay high. We 
propose a formalization predicting that high contributors will self-select into groups 
committed to charitable giving. Testing this experimentally, we let subjects choose between 
two group types, where one type donate a fixed amount to a charity. Contributions in these 
groups stayed high, whereas contributions in the other groups showed the well known 
declining pattern. One implication is that corporate social responsibility may attract more 
responsible employees. 
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Charitable giving is much more widespread in real life than one would expect assuming purely
selsh behavior (see e.g. Andreoni, 1988a, 1990). This willingness to contribute voluntarily is
conrmed by substantial evidence from public good game experiments (e.g. Ledyard, 1995; Fehr
and G achter, 2000, 2002). A striking nding from such experiments, however, is that although
average contributions usually start o at high levels, they tend to decline dramatically as games
are repeated (ibid.). This decline in contributions is found both when group compositions are
held xed (partner designs) and change (stranger design) over time (Andreoni, 1988b; Fehr and
G achter, 2000; Keser and van Winden, 2000; Croson, 1996).
The ability to sustain voluntary contributions is important in many economic contexts.
In the case of teamwork with unobservable individual eort (Holmstr om, 1982), for instance,
individuals' work eort can be regarded as voluntary contributions, and maintaining a high level
of cooperativeness in such teams can be crucial to rms' survival. A better understanding of
how and why voluntary contributions can (or cannot) be sustained is thus of general interest.
In the present paper, we contribute to this goal by rst outlining a theoretical model of
contributions in a public game context, based on the idea that individuals strive towards some
conception of a morally ideal contribution, but that these ideals are aected by others' behavior.
Within this framework, we show that contributions are likely to decline over time, unless high
contributors are matched with each other. Moreover, we show that if individuals' willingness
to contribute are correlated across dierent public goods, high contributors will self-select into
groups for which a pre-commitment to charitable giving is announced. We test our predictions
by means of a public good game experiment where subjects can choose which type of group
to join: either a group where a xed amount is given to the Red Cross, or a group where the
same amount is given to subjects themselves. We nd that high contributions are sustained in
the former group type, while for the latter, the usual declining pattern is observed. Hence our
empirical ndings support the theoretical predictions.
To our knowledge, few attempts have been made to explain, in the language of formal the-
oretical models, the initially high, but declining contributions pattern in repeated public good
games. Nevertheless, previous experimental ndings indicate that this phenomenon may be
largely due to conditional cooperators; that is, subjects who start o contributing relatively
high amounts, but who condition their further cooperation on others' behavior. In Fischbacher
and G achter (2006), for example, 55 percent of the subjects were classied as conditional co-
operators, that is, subjects who contribute more the more others contribute; 23 percent were
classied as free-riders, while less than 2 percent were unconditional cooperators. Moreover, the
authors nd that the heterogeneity of types explains a large part of the decay in contributions.
Similarly, Fischbacher, G achter, and Fehr (2001) nd that 50 percent of their subjects are con-
ditional cooperators, while 30 percent are free-riders. Hauge (2007) asked her subjects about
what they believed to be the morally ideal contribution; the majority of her subjects reported a
conditional moral ideal, approximately equal to the average contribution of the others in their
group. Neugebauer, Perote, Schmidt, and Loos (2009), using an experimental set-up designed
to distinguish conditional cooperation from strategic motives as well as the 'false consensus ef-
fect', conclude that the decline in cooperation appears to be driven by selsh-biased conditional
cooperation and adaptive belief learning. Fischbacher and G achter (forthcoming) nd that on
average, people are \imperfect" conditional cooperators: contributions depend both on subjects'
preferences and their beliefs about others' contributions, but subjects do not fully match oth-
ers' expected contributions. In line with these ndings, the theoretical framework presented
below assumes that individuals strive towards their own moral ideals, but that these ideals are
conditioned on others' behavior.
Our theoretical model predicts that if high contributors are matched with each other, high
average contribution levels can be sustained. This result has been conrmed by several previ-
2ous experiments where, without subjects' knowledge, groups are formed exogenously based on
previous contribution behavior (G achter and Th oni, 2005; Gunnthorsdottir, Houser, and Mc-
Cabe, 2007; Ones and Putterman, 2007). While these studies use exogenous group formation,
the most common case in everyday life is that people self-select into groups; nevertheless, few
scholars have studied endogenous group formation within the context of public good games.1
If some groups succeed in sustaining cooperation, free-riders will have an incentive to invade
those groups. This is, indeed, reected in the endogenous group formation game investigated
by Ehrhart and Keser (1999), who observe that \the more cooperative subjects are continually
on the run from the less cooperative ones. However, the less cooperative ones keep following
them around" (op.cit, p.1). One route to sustain cooperation is to limit access to (or exit from)
endogenously formed groups (Ahn, Isaac, and Salmon, 2008; Page, Putterman, and Unel, 2005).
In the present paper, we suggest another way for high contributors to match. Our proposal
is partly based on Brekke and Nyborg (2008), who demonstrate that if cooperative behavior is
derived from an underlying ethical principle, while the weight attached to this principle varies
between individuals, one would expect to nd a positive correlation between individuals' coop-
erativeness in dierent contexts. Exploring this idea and assuming that individual preferences
to contribute to dierent public goods are positively correlated, we show theoretically that high
contributors will self-select into groups pre-committed to charity contributions, and that these
groups will be able to sustain cooperation.
We test this prediction empirically by means of a public good game with endogenous group
formation, where subjects self-select into groups with dierent payment structures. The experi-
ment consists of three parts. The rst part is a standard one-shot public good game experiment
with exogenous group formation. In the second part, subjects can choose between two group
types, red and blue. The only dierence is that in red groups, a xed amount of money is
donated to the Red Cross; while in blue groups, the same amount is, instead, given to individual
group members. In Part 2 the game is repeated ten times, and the group composition remains
xed for all 10 periods. In Part 3, subjects decide on their preferred group type between each
period, and new groups are formed in every period; moreover, the number of periods is increased
to 20.
We nd that throughout Parts 2 and 3, a substantial share of subjects, about forty percent,
choose to be in red groups. Contributions in red groups are, on average, substantially higher
than in blue groups. However, the dierence is insucient to leave red group membership more
protable in monetary terms, implying that red group membership can hardly be explained by
expectations of higher pecuniary payo. Interestingly, while the blue groups display the usual
deterioration of contributions over time, no clear downwards trend is observed in the red groups.
Our results may be relevant for several real life phenomena, of which one, returning to the
case of teamwork, is corporate social responsibility. A positive correlation between individuals'
preference to contribute to local and global public goods would imply that workers who are
less likely to shirk in teamwork are also more willing to accept lower wages in return for a
socially responsible employer. Brekke and Nyborg (2008) show that this may enable socially
responsible rms not only to survive, but possibly even to drive non-responsible rms out of
business altogether { due to their ability to attract more responsible, and hence more hard-
working, employees. Our experimental results support the empirical relevance of this idea.
2 Theory and predictions
Consider a public good game with n members in each group, where each player is given an
exogenous initial endowment Y . The game is repeated T times and that group composition is
1One exception is G urerk and Rockenbach (2006), who focus on subjects' choice between sanctioning and
non-sanctioning institutions. In their experiment there are only two groups, and group size is endogenous.
3xed throughout T. Let t denote period number (1  t  T). Each player decides simultaneously
and anonymously how much of Y to contribute to her group in period t, gt
i, keeping the remaining
part of Y for herself. Contributions to the group are multiplied by a factor M (1 < M < n),
and then shared equally between group members. Consequently, gt
i is a voluntary contribution
to a local public good.
2.1 Choice of contribution








i   ^ gt
i)2 (1)
where  > 0. Here, ut
i is individual i's utility in period t, xt
i denotes i's monetary payo in
period t, while the other terms reect social preferences. i is the unconditional warm glow of
giving (Andreoni, 1990) experienced by i per unit contributed to the local public good. The
last term can be considered a conditional warm glow (Konow, 2009), which depends not only
on i's own contribution gt
i, but also on the level of some yardstick ^ gt
i. This is similar to the
self-image model of Brekke, Nyborg, and Kverndokk (2003), who interpreted ^ gt
i as i's idea
about the morally ideal contribution, which they assumed, in turn, to be determined through a
Kantian-style ethical argument. Although our assumptions about the determination of ^ gt
i will
be dierent, the interpretation is similar: we consider ^ gt
i to be i's idea of the morally ideal
contribution, implying that conditional warm glow is higher the closer i's actual contribution is
to her perception of what she should, ideally, have contributed. Note that, in accordance with
the social psychological theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), conditional warm glow
is always negative, but less so when gt
i is closer to ^ gt
i.
In period t, monetary payo to i is given by
xt








where j = 1;:::;n are the members of i's group. This implies (rearranging and inserting into
(1)) that utility can be written as
ut

















i   ^ gt
i)2 (3)
Assume, rst, that ^ gt
i and gt
j (j 6= i) are exogenous. Since the nite time horizon rules out
Folk Theorem-type equilibria, the utility maximizing contribution can be solved separately for
each period. The rst order condition for an interior solution requires that marginal warm glow











If the solution is not interior, we must take into account that gt
i can neither be negative nor





































For interior solutions, the optimal contribution is strictly increasing in the ideal ^ gt
i and in
i.
4To improve the readability of the results presented below, we will focus on interior solutions.
While corner solutions cannot, of course, be precluded in general, all our main results in what
follows can be generalized to allow for corner solutions simply by replacing the parameter i by
a truncated parameter ~ i(^ gt
i), dened as follows:





n   ^ gt
i if i < n M
n   ^ gt
i
i if n M
n   ^ gt
i < i < n M
n + (Y   ^ gt
i)
n M
n + (Y   ^ gt
i) if n M
n + (Y   ^ gt
i) < i
(6)
Replacing i by ~ i(^ gt
i) in the middle line of eq. (5) would yield
gt











which gives the optimal gt
i for every individual, even in cases of corner solutions. Other results
provided below can be generalized similarly.
2.2 Conditional ideals
Let us now consider the idea that the morally ideal contribution ^ gt
i may depend on others'
contributions. As mentioned above, there is considerable experimental evidence for such a
relationship (Fischbacher and G achter, 2006; Fischbacher, G achter, and Fehr, 2001; Fischbacher
and G achter, forthcoming); in particular, Hauge (2007), asking subjects in a public good game
experiment directly, found that a majority of subjects reported moral ideals approximately equal
to the average of others' contributions.
Suppose now that ^ gt+1
i , i's idea of her morally ideal contribution in period t+1, is a weighted
average of her previous ideal ^ gt
i and the mean contribution in her group in the previous period,
 gt
i. That is, if  2 [0;1] is the weight placed on the previous ideal,
^ gt+1
i = (1   ) gt
i + ^ gt
i: (8)
For t > 1, the ideal ^ gt
i and thus also the marginal warm glow from contributions to the local public
good will now be increasing in others' contributions, and i will tend to be what Fischbacher,
G achter, and Fehr (2001) classify as a conditional cooperator.
If individuals are forward-looking, eq. (8) will give rise to strategic considerations: person j
may want to contribute high amounts in early periods in order to increase others' ideals, and thus
their contributions, in later periods. While such strategic interaction complicates the analysis
considerably, experimental evidence indicates that this is not the most important force at play
in public good games: testing this explicitly, Neugebauer, Perote, Schmidt, and Loos (2009)
rejected the hypothesis that strategic play is the driving force of the decay in contributions over
time, concluding that \[t]he only viable hypothesis according to our data is the one of conditional
cooperation and adaptive belief learning" (op.cit, p.57). Thus, below we will simplify the analysis
by making the following assumption; individuals are myopic in the sense that they do not take
into account that ideals will change over time; more specically, they act as if ^ gt
j = ^ gs
j for all
s > t and for j = 1;:::;n.
From (8), we note that the ideal will be stable, increasing or decreasing in t when  gi
t = ^ gt
i,
 gt
i > ^ gt
i, or  gt
i < ^ gt





where  i is the mean of j in i's group.
5Proposition 1. Assume that ^ gt
i changes according to Equation (8) and that the utility-maximizing
contribution is interior for all i. Then, individual and average contributions will decline from t
to t + 1 whenever  i < n M
n .2
Given that the ideal evolves over time conditional on average group contributions, Propo-
sition 1 states a condition for how contributions themselves will evolve over time. Specically,
when the average i is suciently low, and the initial ideal ^ gt
i is suciently high, contributions
will decline over time. A high initial ideal may either be caused by unrealistically high expecta-
tions of others' contributions, or by moral principles such as the one Sugden (1984) calls \the
principle of reciprocity": i has a moral obligation to contribute what she would have preferred
everyone to contribute, unless others in her group contributes less than this; in the latter case,
i's responsibility is limited to providing the least amount contributed by others in her group.
2.3 Choice of group type: self-selection
The above Proposition implies that if a group consists solely of individuals with  i  n M
n ,
average contributions will stay high, and may even increase, over time. Our next topic is,
thus, whether individuals with high i values can self-select into the same groups without be-
ing invaded by free-riders. We will show that if some groups are pre-committed to charity
contributions, this may in fact be the case.
Assume that certain groups, which we will call red groups, are pre-committed to charity in
the sense that a person's membership in a red group secures an exogenously xed donation D
(per member per period) to a charity. Assume also that membership in any other group, called
blue groups, provides the subject with an equivalent amount D to keep for herself (in addition
to payos as given in eq. (2) above). The charity can be thought of as a global public good.
In blue groups, D cannot be used for contributions to one's local public good (the group). Let
i = R denote that player i chooses membership in a red group, and i = B otherwise.
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i   ^ gt
i)2 if i = B
(10)
These preferences are exactly as above except for the term i, which measures the unconditional
warm glow of giving experienced by i when donating D to the global public good (the charity).3
Assume further that groups consist of individuals with the same group type, and as before
















j + D if i = B
(11)
When considering whether to choose a red or a blue group, the individual will consider the
utility she gets from each alternative. This depends, of course, on the extra monetary payo






where  (^ g
t
i) is the mean of the truncated coecient given in eq. (6).
3There may, of course, also be a conditional warm glow associated with contributions to the global public good.
Since that good is relevant for people inside and outside the lab alike, it seems plausible that this would be con-
ditioned on all contributions, not only contributions from one's group or from inside the lab. Since contributions
made in the experiment can change global contributions only marginally, we will assume that the \ideal contri-
bution" to the global public good can be considered xed, which means that both conditional and unconditional
warm glow benets will be captured by i.
6of D per period in blue groups and the warm glow per period i in a red group. In addition,
payos will depend on the behavior of others in one's group.
As a starting point, assume that i does not expect systematic dierences between the behav-
ior of subjects in red and blue groups. Assume further that her initial ideal ^ g1
i is exogenously
given. Due to myopia, she will also disregard any changes in her own and others' ideals over
time when making her group choice; hence the only dierence between blue and red group mem-
bership, judged from this myopic position, is that blue groups provide an extra income D per
period, while red groups provide an extra warm glow i per period. Hence, i will choose red
(i = R) if and only if i  D.
Any individual variation in group choice, and hence the global public good donation choice
i is then determined by the parameter i. Note specically that with the above assumptions,
the optimal choice of i is independent of i's own contributions to the local public good, gt
i.
Since the choices of gt
i and i are independent, the only reason to expect a correlation between
gt
i and i in the present model would be if i and i were correlated.
As mentioned briey above, there are in fact reasons to expect such a correlation. Brekke and
Nyborg (2008) demonstrate that if voluntary contributions to a global (environmental quality)
and a local (team production) public good originate from a common underlying ethical principle,
while the strength of the concern for this principle varies between individuals, an individual's
contributions to the two public goods will be positively correlated. The ethical principle they
use is inspired by Kant's categorical imperative (namely, that i's moral satisfaction is increasing
in the social welfare eects in the hypothetical case that everyone acted just like i); they argue,
however, that the same would be true for other underlying ethical principles as well. With
the simpler preference structure proposed in eq. (10), Brekke and Nyborg's argument would
translate into a positive correlation between i and i.
A positive correlation between i and i would have several interesting implications. Below
we explore some of them. Indeed, several recent experimental studies do support the idea of
such a correlation (Altmann, Dohmen, and Wibral, 2008; Blanco, Engelmann, and Normann,
2007; Johnson, Dawes, Fowler, McElreath, and Smirnov, 2009). Theorem 1 is the main formal
result, while the propositions point more explicitly to hypotheses to be tested empirically.
Theorem 1. If i and i are positive, monotone transformations of underlying stochastic vari-
ables bi and yi, where bi and yi are normally distributed and strictly positively correlated, then
ij(i  ^ ) will stochastically strictly dominate ij(i < ^ ), for any threshold ^ .
For proof, see Appendix A.1.
In the following we will invoke the premise of the proposition as an assumption. Note that
allowing i and i to be monotone transforms of a joint normal distribution shows that the
claim is true for a very large class of probability distributions.
Our rst corollary shows that when i and i are positively correlated, expected contribu-
tions4 to the local public good, gt
i, are higher, all else given, for those who choose red, i = R,
than for those who choose blue, i = B.












provided that 0 < gt
i < Y for some i in the support.
Proof. From the discussion above we know that the event fi = Rg ,
n
i > ^ i
o
with ^ i = D
Thus the Proposition applies, and iji = R stochastically strictly dominates iji = B. In
4Expectations here and in the following are to be interpreted as the expectations of an outside observer, that
is, the average value if the game is played many times with dierent individuals drawn from the same population.
7particular this dominance applies in the part of the support where gt
i is interior. Since interior
contributions are linearly increasing in i, the claim follows.
2.4 Group specic conditional ideals
Let us now study what the model predicts as time evolves. Assume now that eq. (8) holds, and
that individuals are myopic and do not, at the outset, expect dierent behavior from members
of blue and red groups.5
From Proposition 1 above, we know that i, or rather its group average, is the crucial
parameter determining whether ideals will in fact decline over time. Moreover, we know that
individuals with high i will be more prone to choose red; these individuals can also be expected
to have higher i (Theorem 1). Thus, individuals' ideals { and thus also their contributions gt
i
{ must be expected to decline faster in blue groups than in red.6
Assume that every i has the same exogenous initial ideal ^ g1
i . Moreover, assume that after
each period, individuals observe the average contribution in their own group. Although there
will be random dierences in i between members in each red, respectively blue, group, the
expected level of i will be equal within each group type. Since individuals hold identical initial
ideals, the expected development of the ideal will also be identical within each group type. Let
^ gt
 denote the expected ideal in group type  = fR;Bg in period t, while  gt
 denotes the expected
average contribution in group type  in period t.
At the beginning of period 2, when one observation has been made, the expected dierence
in ideals is given by
^ g2
R   ^ g2
B = (1   )( g1




( R    B):
where  R = E [iji = R] and  B = E [iji = B] are expected average i in the two group
types. Hence, after the second period,  gt+1
 will dier between red and blue groups both due to
dierent ideals in period t and to dierent i's. In general,7
^ gt+1
R   ^ gt+1
B = (1   )
 
 gt












t( R    B) > 0
where the inequality is due to Proposition 2, securing that  R >  B.
Thus, individuals in red groups must be expected to have, on average, both higher ideals
and higher i values than members of blue groups. Due to the higher values of i, contributions
will typically be higher in red groups even in the rst period; for each subsequent period, the
dierence in contributions will increase, because of the dierent development of the ideal. We
summarize this as a Proposition.
Proposition 3. Given that the ideal changes according to (8), expected contributions to the
local public good is higher in red groups than in blue groups in every period, and the dierence
is increasing over time.
5If individuals are myopic but expect members of red groups to contribute more, this would reinforce the
sorting of individuals with high i into red groups.
6Whether ideals will increase, be constant or decrease in either group types, depends on the level of i in the
group.
7 Allowing for corner solution, the equation can be written
^ g
t+1













For a proof see Appendix A.2.
82.5 Group choice with group specic ideals
Until now, we have assumed that the group composition is kept xed over time. Consider now
the case with T periods where each individual can choose group type for each new period, such
that group composition changes over time.
In the previous section, we saw that the ideal developed dierently in red and blue groups.
Since any given individual was then only member of one group throughout the repeated game,
the ideal in the other group type would be largely irrelevant for her; as the game evolved, she
might not even be aware that contributions were developing dierently. Let us now assume that
after each period, every individual receives information about average contributions in at least
one blue and at least one red group. If the average contributions dier between group types,
individual i's idea of the morally ideal contribution may not be the same for both group types:
if she expects others in her group to contribute a lot, it seems more reasonable that she will
demand more of herself, and vice versa.
Let us thus modify (8), the equation determining i's ideal, such that in any period t > 1, i
has two ideals, ^ gt
iR and ^ gt
iB, one for each group type, where the ideal for group type  is updated
using the information i has received about average contributions in group type :
^ gt+1
i = (1   ) gt
i + ^ gt
i (12)
where  gt
i is the information received by i in period t about average contributions in group type
. Since individuals within the same group type have dierent i's and are distributed randomly
into groups, we may have ^ gt
i 6= ^ gt
j for i 6= j if i and j have received information from dierent
groups. Still, an outside observer has of course no reasons initially to have dierent expectations
for i and j. We can thus dene a group type specic expected ideal: ^ gt
 = E(^ gt
i) = E(^ gt
j).
A main dierence between constant and changing group compositions over time, is that
constant group composition gives a stronger strategic motive for early contributions. We showed
above, however, that due to myopia group choice did not depend on such dynamics even for
constant group compositions, only on whether D ? i. Moreover, the choice of red versus blue
and the choice of gt
i were independent. With myopic individuals, the results will be very similar
when group composition is allowed to change over time. In the rst period, individuals with
high i will self-select into red groups, just as before; thus expected average contributions in
the rst period will be higher in red than in blue groups, the result is that ^ g1
R > ^ g1
B. For later
periods, i's group-specic ideals ^ gt
i are updated according to (12); and both values of  and
ideals are in expectation higher in red than blue groups. The result is that ^ gt
R > ^ gt
B, for every
period. Moreover, as more periods pass, the dierence must be expected to increase.
Now, let gt
i denote the contribution of individual i in period t given that i has chosen to
be in a group of type  in this period. (As i can actually be in only one type of group at a
time, either gt
Ri or gt














Note that the last term is independent of group type. Since ^ gt
R > ^ gt
B, this Proposition follows:
Proposition 4. For t > 1, individuals will in expectation contribute more as a member of a red
group than as member of a blue group.
The following Proposition also follows directly from equation (13):
Proposition 5. Contributions are increasing in agents' ideals.
Finally, consider the choice between red and blue. As above, those who choose red have
high values of i and, by correlation, of i. When considering ideals that depend on group
9type, there is an additional argument for choosing red, which is strongest for those with the
highest values of i: Entering a red group will induce i to make larger contributions than she
would in a blue group. Thus, red group membership yields more warm glow both in terms of
the unconditional warm glow of global public good provision, i, but also more warm glow of
local public good provision, igi, which is increasing in i. Thus, this argument reinforces the
expected self-selection of cooperative individuals into the red groups. We can summarize it in
the following Proposition, for which the formal details are in Appendix A.3:
Proposition 6. Individuals are more likely to choose red groups the higher the observed dier-
ence in contributions  gt
iR    gt
iB is.
3 Experimental design
Let us now explain our experimental design in somewhat more detail. As mentioned in the
introduction, the experiment consists of 3 parts, a one-shot public good game, a repeated game
with xed groups (a partner game), and a sequence of games with varying group composition (a
stranger game). All subjects participate in all three parts in the same order. We denote by t = 0
the one-shot game, by t = 1;:::;10 the 10 periods of the partner game, and by t = 11;:::;30
the 20 periods of the stranger game.
Part 1 of the experiment is a standard one-shot public good game experiment with exogenous
group formation. Below, we will call this part the one-shot game. Groups of 3 are formed
randomly, and each subject is given an initial endowment of NOK 60.8 The subject's task is to
decide how much to allocate to her group and how much to keep for herself. Every contribution
to the group is doubled by the experimenters, and then divided equally between the three group
members. Each subject is thus paid according to the following monetary payo function:
x0









i is subject i's monetary payo and g0
i is i's contribution to her group in the one-shot
game.
Before this part starts, subjects are tested in their understanding of the instructions. They
are informed that two additional experiments will take place after this one, but that their choice
in part 1 neither will aect their payos nor available choices in parts 2 and 3. No further
information is provided about the contents of parts 2 and 3. Moreover, before proceeding to
part 2, subjects receive no feedback about what has happened in part 1.
Part 2 of the experiment is a repeated public good game where the group composition
remains xed for all 10 periods. In what follows, this part will be called the partner game. The
stage game is very similar to the one-shot game described above. Before the repeated public
good game is played, however, each subject can choose whether she prefers to be in a red or
blue group9. For each member of a red group, an extra NOK 50 is donated to the Norwegian
Red Cross. Each member of a blue group receives, instead, the extra NOK 50 herself. To the
largest extent possible, subjects are allocated to groups of their preferred type; if the number of
subjects preferring a given group type is not divisible by 3, there will be one mixed group, and
the type of this group is determined by the majority preference within the group.
The payo function for a member of a red group in any period of the partner game (part 2)
8Given the exchange rate at the time of the experiment (February 2008), this was equivalent to about 11 USD.
9In the experiment, group types were called Z groups and X groups instead of red and blue, in order to avoid
framing eects. To avoid confusion, there is a reminder of the dierence on every screen where subjects make
choices concerning X and Z.
10can then be written as
xt







for t = 1;:::;10, and for a member of a blue group,
xt






for t = 1;:::;10.
Actual payment to i for her choices in the partner game is determined by her average









For given contribution levels, the monetary payo to members of blue groups must obviously be
higher than in red groups. However, we can have xt
iR > xt
iB (t 2 f1;:::;10g) if the contributions
of the other two group members are suciently higher in the red group. With our design, we
will have xt
iR > xt
iB if the average other in the red group contributes at least NOK 37,5 more
than the average other in the blue group (that is, if the sum of others' contributions is at least
NOK 75 higher in the red than in the blue group).
Subjects are tested in their understanding of the instructions before the partner game starts.
After each period, every subject receives feedback on how many units she contributed, how
many units were contributed on average in her group, and her calculated monetary payo from
that period, xt
iB or xt
iR. Due to the feedback given, individual choices in the partner game can
be considered independent observations only in period 1.
Part 3 of the experiment is quite similar to part 2, but now new groups are formed in every
period. Below, this part will thus be called the stranger game. Moreover, subjects now decide




iB for t = 11;:::;30 are calculated exactly as in the partner game,
that is, according to eq. (15) and (16). Actual monetary payout to subjects is determined as
the average calculated period payo over all 20 periods (but note that now i may be a member
of a red group in some periods and of a blue group in others).
Among those who have chosen the same group type, groups are formed randomly in every
period. As in part 2, if the number of subjects preferring a given group type is not divisible by
3, there will be one mixed group.
Between each period, each subject receives information about how many units she con-
tributed to the public good in that period, and how many units were contributed on average in
her group. In addition, each subject is informed of the average contribution in one red group and
one blue group.10 Due to the feedback given between periods, observations cannot be considered
independent.
4 Experimental results
The experiment was programmed in z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and conducted at the Oeconlab
at the University of Oslo in February 2008. 87 subjects recruited among students from several
departments at the University of Oslo participated in the experiment.
10To maximize the variation in the information received by dierent subjects, each subject is either shown the
average contribution of the red group with the highest average contribution or that of the red group with the
lowest average contribution, each with 50% probability. Likewise, each subject is shown the average contribution
of the blue group with either the highest or the lowest average contribution, each with 50% probability. In the
instructions, subjects are simply informed that they will be shown the average of one red and one blue group.
11Figures 1 and 2 summarize the data. Recall that period 0 corresponds to the one-shot game,
period 1-10 to the partner game, and period 11-30 the stranger game. In gure 1 subjects'
choice of group type is shown in the lower panel, while actual group types are shown in the
upper panel. Remember that in sessions where the number preferring a given group type was
not dividable by three, a mixed group was established, which type was decided by the majority
preference of it's members.
As illustrated in the upper panel, there were 41% pure red and 52% pure blue groups, while
7% of groups were mixed in the partner game (here illustrated by the lighter shade). In the
stranger game, the number of red groups was relatively stable during the 20 periods; averaged
across all periods, the average percentage of subjects in red groups was 36%.
The lower panel of Figure 1 shows players' group choices. Again, the fractions remain fairly
stable over the course of the game. The darker colors illustrate that about 25% of our subjects
consistently chose blue, while 10% consistently chose red, during the entire 20 periods of the
stranger game. The remaining 65% switched at least once between choosing red and blue during
the stranger game.
4.1 Contributions
Figure 2 illustrates average contribution levels of red and blue groups respectively. The gure
reveals a rather striking pattern: First, average contribution in red groups is higher than in blue
groups in the one-shot game, in every period of the partner game, and in every period of the
stranger game. Moreover, contributions in the red groups do not, in contrast to the blue groups,
appear to decrease over time.
Following Proposition 2, we expect those who have self-selected into red groups to contribute
more than others to the local public good. We can thus formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. In any given period, contributions to the local public good are higher in red
groups than in blue groups.
The lower panel of Figure 2 shows the test statistics from an ordinary t-test, a t-test clus-
tering at the group level, and a Mann-Whitney test respectively. All these test whether mean
contributions are equal for subjects in red and blue groups (for period 0: those who later choose
red, respectively blue). The two t-tests assume draws from a normal distribution, while the
Mann-Whitney test is robust to the distribution of the population, but with the cost of weaker
test power. As shown in the lower panel of Figure 2, the ordinary t-test gives support for Hy-
pothesis 1 from period 2 onward, at a 5% signicance level. Since individual contributions cannot
be expected to be independent between periods, however, this tells us only that contributions
are signicantly higher in red groups, and does not necessarily indicate that subjects in red and
blue groups are drawn from dierent populations. The clustered t-test and the non-parametric
Mann-Whitney test give support for hypothesis 1 from period 4 onwards.
Utilizing the whole panel of observations gives us further support for Hypothesis 1. This
is done in Table 1, where we regress contribution on group choice. We study the partner and
stranger games separately and jointly, with and without period dummies. Columns (1) and
(2) show that in the partner game, contributions to the local public good is on average 15
units higher in red than blue groups. This dierence is signicant. Nothing much happens
with the coecient when period dummies are included. As members of one group play against
each other in ten consecutive periods, we might worry about correlation between players. To
solve this potential problem, all regressions are clustered at the group level.11 In the stranger
game, where players can choose group type in each period, the results are even stronger: Now,
contributions in red groups are about 21 units higher than in blue groups.
11For the stranger game and the joint analysis, groups do not keep together, so we instead cluster on the
group-period.

























































1 10 20 30
Period
Notes: The rst panel shows the number of red and blue groups by period. Mixed groups in light
colors, homogeneous groups in dark colors.
The second panel shows the fraction of agents who choose red and blue groups by period. The
dark colored areas show the fraction of agents who consistently choose either red or blue groups
in all the 20 periods in the stranger game.











































1 10 20 30
Period
Above: Average contribution by red and blue groups by period.
Below: Test statistics of the dierence between red and blue contributions.
The solid line represents t-statistics from t-tests, the dashed-dotted line similar tests clustering
at the group level, and the dashed line z-statistics from Mann-Whitney tests. The horizontal
dotted lines are signicance levels of 0.05 and 0.01.






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0 10 20 30
Period
Blue Red Red and Red Cross
Note: Data from mixed groups are excluded.
Figure 3 shows the average prot in each group as well as the prot in red groups plus the
contribution to the Red Cross. We see that it is never privately protable to join a red group,
so it is not rational to do so strategically.12 However, as contributions on average are higher,
the sum of private prots and contributions to the Red Cross (which corresponds to the social
surplus) is higher than private prots in blue groups.
From Proposition 1, we know that contributions should decline over time in groups with
suciently low warm glow of giving . This leads to the hypothesis
Hypothesis 2. Contributions averaged over both group types decline over time in the partner
game.
This pattern is well-known and well-documented in the literature (Ledyard, 1995). Column
(1) of Table 2 shows that this pattern is also found in our data; contributions are lower in later
periods, and this dierence is statistically signicant.
From Figure 2, we see that this is mostly driven by the decline in the blue groups. This is
in line with Proposition 3, which leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. The dierence in contributions between red and blue groups will increase over
time.
Column (2) of Table 2 conrms that declining contributions are, indeed, mostly found in
blue groups. The interaction term between period and a dummy for being in a red group is
substantially and signicantly higher in the last periods, which supports Hypothesis 3.
If subjects strive towards some ideal which is positively aected by other group members'
expected contributions, then the same individual will contribute (weakly) more to the local
public good as a member of a red group than if she is in a blue group. From Proposition 4, we
can formulate our fourth hypothesis:
12Contributing 0 yields an average prot of 87 in blue groups and 62 in red groups, and the dierence is positive
although declining in all periods.
16Table 2: Contributions by period
(1) (2)
Period All Blue Red Dierence
2 -1.092 -2.875 1.103 3.978
(-0.76) (-1.53) (0.53) (1.40)
3 -2.115 -3.708 -0.154 3.554
(-1.06) (-1.21) (-0.07) (0.97)
4 -3.276 -8.500*** 3.154 11.65***
(-1.59) (-3.02) (1.22) (2.83)
5 -3.299 -8.583*** 3.205 11.79***
(-1.33) (-2.84) (1.30) (3.41)
6 -3.736* -7.271** 0.615 7.886**
(-1.83) (-2.39) (0.29) (2.15)
7 -5.276** -8.687*** -1.077 7.611*
(-2.34) (-2.97) (-0.36) (1.82)
8 -6.184*** -10.69*** -0.641 10.05**
(-2.65) (-3.78) (-0.20) (2.26)
9 -9.966*** -17.52*** -0.667 16.85***
(-3.46) (-4.55) (-0.25) (3.69)
10 -17.24*** -23.75*** -9.231** 14.52***
(-6.22) (-7.77) (-2.28) (2.84)
R2 0.146 0.156
N 870 870
Notes: Dependent variable is contribution. Specication (1) includes dummies for each period
in the partner game. Specication (2) includes separate period dummies for members of red and
blue groups, and the dierences between the estimated coecients are also reported. Z-values
clustered at the group level are reported in parentheses.
*, **, and *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
17Table 3: Results from the stranger game: Contributions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Red group 21.15*** 21.10*** 12.46*** 12.27***
(7.52) (7.43) (5.23) (5.25)
Period FE No Yes No Yes
Indivdual FE No No Yes Yes
R2 0.169 0.189 0.064 0.115
N 1740 1740 1740 1740
Notes: The dependent variable is contribution. Z-values clustered at the individual level in
parentheses.
*, **, and *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Hypothesis 4. An individual will contribute more to the local public good when member of a
red group than when member of a blue group.
Contributions in the stranger game are regressed on group choice in Table 3. As the table
shows, contributions are signicantly higher in red groups in all specications. Note particularly
the individual xed eects model in specications (3) and (4). An individual who changes group
type during the stranger game contributes on average about 12 units more to the public good
when she is a member of a red group than when she is in a blue group. This supports Hypothesis
4.
The theoretical model introduced above assumes that contributions depend on a moral ideal,
which depends on the observed level of contributions in groups. This was summarized in Propo-
sition 5, and leads us to formulate the following Hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5. Contributions are increasing in the perceived average contribution level in one's
group.
To explore how perceptions about contributions in red and blue groups aect contributions
and group choice, we gave subjects dierentiated information in the stranger game. As explained
above, at the end of each period subjects were informed about the contributions in one red and
one blue group in addition to their own group, but the players did not get information about
the same groups.
The rational way to aggregate this information is though Bayesian updating. Appendix B
explains how we model this in the current context. Essentially, we assume that each subject holds
a prior distribution of the mean contribution among red and blue group members. After each
period, subjects use observations from their own group, as well as the provided information, to
update their beliefs according to Bayes' rule. The calculated beliefs are then used as explanatory
variables in the estimations shown in Tables 4 and 5. Here, t
i denotes player i's best estimate
of contributions in group type  in period t, and t
i = t
iR   t
iB is her expected dierence in
contributions between red and blue groups.
Table 4 shows the eect of beliefs on own contribution. Columns (1) and (2) show results
from the whole sample in the stranger game, with and without individual xed eects. In both
specications, increased belief about others' contributions increase own contributions, although
not always signicantly. In columns (3) and (4), regressions are run separately for red and blue
groups. Now, belief about the group one is in has a positive and signicant eect, whereas
the belief of the other group has no signicant eect. All in all, these ndings tend to support
Hypothesis 5.
18Table 4: Results from stranger game: Eect of beliefs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Red group 20.19*** 12.43***
(7.20) (5.03)
blue 0.0216 0.216** 0.294** 0.00479
(0.10) (2.45) (2.17) (0.07)
red 0.690*** 0.123 0.0780 0.321**
(3.32) (1.08) (0.55) (2.20)
Period FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Indivdual FE No Yes Yes Yes
Group type Both Both Blue Red
R2 0.216 0.109 0.067 0.051
N 1653 1653 1060 593
Notes: The dependent variable is contribution. The 's are from the Bayesian updating, i.e.
the best guess of the mean contribution of blue and red players given the subject's available
information. Z-values clustered at the individual level in parentheses.
*, **, and *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
4.2 Group choice
In the experiment, players can choose what type of group to join: before the partner game, and
before each period of the stranger game. As a parallel to Proposition 2 we should expect that
players that had high contributions in the one-shot game should have a tendency to choose red
groups later on. As this is purely a question of correlation and not a causal relationship, we
can also study this by testing whether contributions are higher in the one-shot game for players
who chose red at the beginning of the partner game than those who chose blue. From the upper
panel of Figure 2, we see that contributions are actually higher in the former group, but the
lower panel reveals that this dierence is not statistically signicant.
More interesting is the sequence of decisions in the stranger game. These are analyzed in
Table 5. Column (1) is a simple estimation to indicate persistence in group choice: Having
chosen a red group in one period substantially and signicantly increases the probability of
choosing a red group in the next period. As a counterpart to Proposition 6 in the theoretical
section, we have the following hypothesis regarding group choice:
Hypothesis 6. The probability of choosing a red group is increasing in the perceived dierence
between mean contributions in red and blue groups.




Column (2) of Table 5 is a regression where we only include this estimated belief about the
dierence of the mean contributions between red and blue groups. We can see that higher
expected contributions in red as compared to blue groups tend to increase the likelihood of
choosing a red group in the next period. Given that the potential range of  is -60 to 60 and
the observed range -31 to 45, the quantitative eect is substantial. In Column (3) we instead
include the dierence between the two pieces of information provided in the current period,
which has a similar eect as the s. In Column (4) we set the two up against each other,
and here it turns out that the current information retains signicance whereas  becomes
insignicant. Hence it seems as players put more emphasis on recently received information.
To see whether information about both groups are equally important, we replace  with the
separate s in Column (5). In sum, there seems to be support for Hypothesis 6, but agents are






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































20Finally, it is interesting to explore whether subjects in red groups react dierently to updated
information about others behavior than those in blue groups. Column (6) of Table 5 interacts
the belief variable with an indicator variable for having chosen a red group in the partner game.
We see that subjects from red groups in the partner game, do, in fact, react less strongly to
information. In Column (7), we undertake a similar estimation, this time with information
interacted with the fraction of time spent in red groups so far in the stranger game. It seems
that this variable has little impact on information processing.
5 Conclusion
In public good games, many subjects contribute relatively large amounts in the rst period, but
decrease their contributions substantially as the game is repeated. In this paper we have pro-
posed a formal model of this, based on the assumption that both unconditional and conditional
altruism play a role. Using the same formal framework, we have shown that if there is a positive
correlation between the strength of individuals' unconditional altruism towards dierent pub-
lic goods, subjects who are highly cooperative will self-select into groups committed to charity
donations, and these groups may be able to sustain cooperation.
Our predictions were tested by means of a public good game with endogenous group for-
mation. Before making their contribution choice, subjects could choose which type of group
they preferred to be a member of. The dierence between group types was that a xed extra
amount of money was donated either to the Red Cross (red groups) or to individual subjects
(blue groups). Groups were then formed randomly, but to the largest extent possible respecting
subjects' group type preferences.
Throughout the periods, the share of red groups was always between 30 and 45 percent,
with no clear trend in either direction. Average contributions were signicantly higher in red
groups. The dierence was not suciently large, however, to leave red group membership equally
protable, in monetary terms, as blue group membership. Thus, individuals hardly chose red
group membership in the hope of earning more money due to others' high contributions.
High contributors in an independent one-shot public good game also chose red groups more
often than low contributors, although not signicantly so. However, we found that while con-
tributions in blue groups decreased substantially over time, contributions stayed high in the
red groups. Finally, we found that subjects who shifted between being in red and blue groups
contributed signicantly more when in a red group compared to when in a blue group.
In line with previous experimental evidence, we thus have shown both theoretically and
empirically that it is possible to sustain cooperation provided that the group consists of the
right people: "the good guys". In addition, we have shown that pre-commitment to charitable
giving is one possible way for these good guys to nd each other.
Willingness to contribute to one public good (here, the Red Cross) can be taken as a signal of
high willingness to contribute to other public goods as well (here, the group's material benet).
Committing oneself to a group donating to charity consequently increases the chance of being
matched with others who contribute a lot to the group. Thus matched, conditional cooperators
can sustain high average contribution levels. While a pre-commitment to charity donations
tend to attract high contributors, the increasing dierence in average contributions over time
in the two group types is driven by the dynamic interaction between conditional cooperators.
The question is therefore not only whether you are a good or a bad guy; but, perhaps more
importantly, whether you are playing with the good guys.
21References
Ahn, T., R. M. Isaac, and T. C. Salmon (2008): \Endogenous group formation," Journal
of Public Economic Theory, 10, 171{194.
Altmann, S., T. Dohmen, and M. Wibral (2008): \Do the Reciprocal Trust Less?," Eco-
nomics Letters, 99, 454{57.
Andreoni, J. (1988a): \Privately Provided Public Goods in a Large Economy: The Limits of
Altruism.," Journal of Public Economics, 35(1), 57{73.
Andreoni, J. (1988b): \Why free ride?," Journal of Public Economics, 37, 291{304.
Andreoni, J. (1990): \Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-
Glow Giving," Economic Journal, 100(401), 464{477.
Blanco, M., D. Engelmann, and H. Normann (2007): \A Within-Subject Analysis of
Other-Regarding Preferences," Mimeo, Royal Holloway, University of London.
Brekke, K. A., and K. Nyborg (2008): \Attracting Responsible Employees: Green Produc-
tion as Labor Market Screening," Resource and Energy Economics, 30, 509{526.
Brekke, K. A., K. Nyborg, and S. Kverndokk (2003): \An economic model of moral
motivation," Journal of Public Economics, 87, 337{3354.
Croson, R. T. A. (1996): \Partners and strangers revisited," Economics Letters, 53(1), 25{32.
Ehrhart, K.-M., and C. Keser (1999): \Mobility and cooperation: On the run," Working
Paper 99s-24, CIRANO, Montreal.
Fehr, E., and S. G achter (2000): \Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experi-
ments," The American Economic Review, 90(4), 980{994.
(2002): \Altruistic punishment in humans," Nature, 415(6868), 137{140.
Festinger, L. (1957): A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford University Press, Stanford,
CA.
Fischbacher, U. (2007): \z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments,"
Experimental Economics, 10(2), 171{178.
Fischbacher, U., and S. G achter (2006): \Heterogeneous social preferences and the dy-
namics of free riding in public goods," IZA Discussion Papers 2011.
(forthcoming): \Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public
Goods," American Economic Review.
Fischbacher, U., S. G achter, and E. Fehr (2001): \Are people conditionally cooperative?
Evidence from a public goods experiment," Economics Letters, 71, 397{404.
G achter, S., and C. Th oni (2005): \Social learning and voluntary cooperation among like-
minded people," Journal of the European Economic Association, 3(2-3), 303{314.
Gunnthorsdottir, A., D. Houser, and K. McCabe (2007): \Disposition, history and
contributions in public goods experiments," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,
62(2), 304{315.
22G urerk,  O., B., and Rockenbach (2006): \The competetive Advantage of Sanctioning
Institutions," Science, 312, 108{111.
Hauge, K. E. (2007): \Normative reection in a public good game experiment," Mimeo,
University of Oslo.
Holmstr om, B. (1982): \Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, 13, 324{340.
Johnson, N. L., and S. Kotz (1972): Distributions in Statistics: Continuous Multivariate
Distributions. John Wiley & Sons, New York.
Johnson, T., C. T. Dawes, J. H. Fowler, R. McElreath, and O. Smirnov (2009): \The
role of egalitarian motives in altruistic punishment," Economics Letters, 102, 192{94.
Keser, C., and F. van Winden (2000): \Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contribu-
tions to Public Goods," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 102(1), 23{39.
Konow, J. (2009): \Mixed Feelings: Theories and Evidence of Altruism," Mimeo, Loyola
Marymount University.
Ledyard, J. O. (1995): \Public goods: A Survey of Experimental Research," in The Handbook
of Experimental Economics, ed. by J. H. Kagel, and A. E. Roth, pp. 111{194. Princeton
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
Neugebauer, T., J. Perote, U. Schmidt, and M. Loos (2009): \Selsh-biased conditional
cooperation: On the decline of contributions in repeated public goods experiments," Journal
of Economic Psychology, 30, 52{60.
Ones, U., and L. Putterman (2007): \The ecology of collective action: A public goods and
sanctions experiment with controlled group formation," Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization, 62(4), 495{521.
Page, T., L. Putterman, and B. Unel (2005): \Voluntary Association in Public Goods
Experiments: Reciprocity, Mimicry and Eciency," The Economic Journal, 115(October),
1032{1053.
Sugden, R. (1984): \Reciprocity: The supply of Public Goods Through Voluntary Contribu-
tions," The Economic Journal, 94(dec), 1281{1302.
A Proofs







. Then it follows from standard results on conditional normal
distributions (see e.g. Johnson and Kotz, 1972, Ch 35.3) that










































































































where  and  denote the pdf and cdf of the standard normal distribution. Hence the former
stochastically dominates the latter if
R z
 1 f 
Y (b)   f 




















































































 dx dx+ > 0:













































A db > 0:
It follows that (17) always holds, and hence that bijyi > Y , will stochastically dominate bijyi < Y .
It trivially follows that we can replace yi and Y with i = g (yi) and ^  = g (Y ) for any mono-
tonically increasing function g, so bijred stochastically dominates bijblue. Finally stochastic
dominance is preserved by monotonically increasing relations, so ijred stochastically dominates
ijblue for i = h(bi) for any monotonically increasing function h.
A.2 Proof of footnote 7
Suppose that the claim
^ gt+1
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holds for t + 1  k. We want to show that it holds for t + 1 = k + 1 as well. Note rst that the
average contribution is given by
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Combining the two equations above with equation (8), we nd that
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Since we know from the text that the claim is true for k = 2, the general claim follows by
induction.
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Inserting the optimal contribution
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we see that i will chose red if








































Note that individual i is more likely to choose red the higher the dierence in contributions  
 gt
iR    gt
iB

is, as claimed in Proposition 6.
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In expectations ^ gt
R > ^ gt
B, and thus we see that both a high i as well as a high value of i increase
the likelihood that individual i will choose the red group. We can thus expect a high value of
i in red groups both because of the correlation with i but also due to the direct impact of i.
The intuitive reason why i enters directly here is that those with a high i have an additional
motive to enter a group where they will be expected to make high contribution, and that is the
warm glow they derive from high contributions. This only matters when expected contributions
are dierent between dierent group types.
25B Details of the Bayesian updating
In the stranger game, agents are allowed to choose their group at the beginning of each period.
Furthermore, at the end of each period, they are informed about the average contribution and
prot of one blue and one red group. Assume that the contribution of a randomly chosen
individual j is distributed
gjj  N(;2)  2 fR;Bg
where the variance 2 is assumed known but the means R and B are only imperfectly known.
Specically, it is assumed that at time t, agent i has prior distributions
 jFi;t  N(i;;t;!2
i;;t)  2 fR;Bg
where Fi;t is i's information set at time t.
Each individual observes his own group, one blue group  B and one red group  R. He uses
Bayesian updating to construct posterior distributions. Let  ei denote the average contribution
in i's own group excluding his own contributions, and  e denote the averages in  . Finally,
there are N members in both i's group in the groups  . Let Ii; take the value 1 if i is in a































In the empirical implementation, 2 is taken as known and estimated as the variance of all
contributions in the stranger game. The prior i;;0 is given by the average contribution of the
group type, but with a high variance !2
i;;0 = 1002. As a consequence, for t > 0, i;;t is almost
independent of the prior.
C Instructions
Welcome to this experiment in economics. The results from this experiment will be used in a
research project. Therefore, it is important that you follow certain rules. It is important that
you do not talk or in other ways communicate with any of the other participants during the
experiment. Please turn o mobile phones, and use only pre-opened software on the computer.
In the experiment, there will be full anonymity, which means that no other participants in this
room will know which decisions you in particular make during the experiment. In addition, it is
not possible to track the decisions made during the experiments back to individuals. You will
be notied when the experiment starts, and when you can start entering your answers on the
computer in front of you. If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your
hand, and an experimenter will come to you and answer your question in private.
You will receive money in compensation for participating in this experiment. How much
money you receive will depend on the decisions you make during the experiment. After the
experiment is over, you will be informed about your total payment. The person who organizes
the practical payments will not now the details of the experiment and can therefore not know
which decisions you have made.
26Instructions Part 1
This experiment consists of three parts. Your choices in part 1 will not inuence what happens,
or what payment you can receive from part 2 and 3.
In part 1 of the experiment, you will be part of a group consisting of 3 people (yourself and 2
others). All three members of the group will receive an endowment of 60 NOK each. Your task
is to decide how you want to allocate the money. You shall choose how many NOK you want
to keep, and how much you want to contribute to an account which belongs to your group.
Your compensation for participating in the experiment, depends on how much of the en-
dowment you choose to keep, how much you contribute to the group account, and how much
the others in your group contribute to the group account. When all members of your group
have decided how they wish to contribute to the group account, the total amount contributed
to your group's account will be doubled and then divided equally between the three of you. For
each NOK you keep, you (and only you) will earn 1 NOK. For each NOK you contribute to the
group account, you and all the others in your group will earn 2/3 NOK. The same applies for
the others in your group.
Examples: If for instance you contribute all your 60 NOK to the group account and the
others in your group keep all for themselves, you will be paid 40 NOK (2/3 x the 60 NOK you
contributed to the group account =40), while the two others will be paid 100 NOK each (the 60
NOK they kept + 2/3 x the 60 NOK you contributed to the group account). If all three group
members contribute the entire endowment to the group account, each group member will be
paid 120 NOK each (2/3 x 3 x 60 =120 NOK). If all three group members contribute 30 NOK,
each group member will be paid 90 kroner each (the 30 NOK kept, plus 2/3 x 3 x 30 NOK =
60 NOK to each from the group account). If all three contribute zero to the group account, all
three are paid the initial endowment of 60 kroner.
Notice that what happens in your group does not inuence participants in other groups.
Likewise, the decisions of participants in other groups than your own does not inuence you.
It is important for the results of the experiment that there are no misunderstandings of the
instructions. To ensure that the instructions are clear, we ask you to ll in the question sheet
on the desk in front of you. This is not a test of your knowledge, but insurance for us that we
have given you clear instructions. You will now get a couple of minutes to read through the
instructions and answer the questions on the sheet. Raise your hand when you are nished, or
if you have any questions.
Instructions Part 2
The experiment will now continue. Your decisions in part 2 will not inuence what happens or
the payment you can receive in part 3.
Part 2 of the experiment is quite similar to part 1. In dierence from part 1, there are now
rst choose the type of group you prefer being a member of: X or Z.
When all participants have chosen their preferred group type, the computer will randomly
create groups of 3 according to preferred group type. If the number of participants preferring
one type is not divisible by three, there will be one mixed group. The type of the mixed group
will be decided by the majority wish of the mixed group. All participants in all groups will be
informed about what kind of group they are members of, and whether it is a homogenous or a
mixed group.
Part 2 consists of 10 periods. Your actual payment from part 2 will consist of your average
payo across these 10 periods.
The group composition will be the same in all periods, and your group will NOT consist of
the same individuals as in part 1 of the experiment. In each period each participant will receive
an endowment of 60 NOK. Just as in part 1, your task is to decide how many NOK to keep, and
how many NOK to contribute to the group account. After each period, you will receive feedback
27concerning how many units you yourself contributed to the group account, how many units the
other two in your group on average contributed to the group account, and your calculated payo
from that period. Just like before, the total amount in the group account will be doubled, and
then divided equally between the three group members. Your actual payo from part 2 will be
the average of your calculated payos from the 10 periods of part 2.
What is the dierence between the group types? Group type X: Those organizing the
experiment have inserted an extra amount of money into the group account in advance, such
that each participant in every X-group will receive an extra payo of 50 NOK per period Group
type Z: Here there is no extra payo to the participants. Instead, those that organize the
experiment in each period for each participant in each Z-group will reserve 50 NOK to the
Norwegian Red Cross. Just as your payo is the average of your calculated payo over the 10
periods, the actual payment to the Red Cross will be equal to the average of the reserved for
the Red Cross over the 10 periods.
Again we ask you to ll in a sheet of questions. The sheet will be handed out, and you will
get some minutes to read through the instructions on your own, and answer the questions. Raise
your hand when you are nished, or if you have any questions.
Instructions Part 3
In this last part of the experiment there are 20 periods. In this part you will be able to choose
group type between every period. In each period you will be part of a new group. Otherwise
the rules are as they were in part 2.
After every period you will receive feedback about your calculated payo from the previous
period, and how many units were contributed to the group account on average in your group.
You will also be told how many units on average was contributed to the group account in one
X- and one Z-group, and the average calculated payo for the members of these two groups.
The rules for payo are as before: Contributions from group members are doubled and then
divided equally between the group members. In X-groups each member will in addition receive
a calculated payo of 50 kroner each in each period. In Z-groups 50 kroner for each member in
each period is reserved for the Red Cross. From part 3 your actual payo is equal to the average
of your calculated payo in the 20 periods. The Norwegian Red Cross will receive an amount
equal to the average of what is reserved over the 20 periods.
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